Federal Court Review of Arbitrary State Court Decisions

INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, decisions by state courts or agencies on civil matters or criminal proceedings 1 seem entirely arbitrary. An "arbitrary" decision is one that appears irrational because it conflicts with the factual record, conflicts with statutes or precedent, or contradicts itself. 2 The Supreme Court's position on whether arbitrary state decisions violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is inconsistent. On one hand, the Court, relying on the well-established principle of federalism that federal courts may not review the correctness of state decisions of state law, 3 has held that the arbitrariness of a state decision does not raise any issues of federal constitutional law. Thus, in cases where a state court or agency apparently has misinterpreted state law, the Court has held that "mere errors of state law" do not violate due process. 4 In addition, the Court has been reluctant to review the sufficiency of the evidence in state civil proceedings. 5 The Court has also been unwilling to require the state court or agency to explain any 1. For the purposes of this Note, state decisions encompass (1) state court and agency deci· sions on civil matters and (2) state court and agency decisions in criminal proceedings not constituting findings of misconduct that ignore the threat of prison confinement. Examples from the second category include sentencing decisions, but not criminal convictions or parole revocations.
2. Cf. United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243-44 n.14 (1946) (defining "arbitrary" as "without adequate determining principle" or " [f] ixed or arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, .
•. decisive but unreasoned"). 444, 455 (1924) ("The mere reversal by a state court of its previous decision, as in this case before us, whatever its effect upon contracts, does not, as we have seen, violate any clause of the Federal Constitution.'').
5.
See, e.g., American Radio Assn. v. Mobile S.S. Assn., 419 U.S. 215, 231 (1974); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948) ; see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 550 (1981) (state court findings presumed to be correct in federal habeas corpus proceedings).
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inconsistencies in its decisions. 6 On the other hand, the Court appears to have reached an opposite result in three cases, suggesting that due process does require reversal of arbitrary state decisions in cases in which the state decision lacked evidentiary support or deviated from state law. In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 7 the Court reversed a state criminal conviction that presented "the stark problem of arbitrariness" because the decision was entirely lacking in evidentiary support. 8 In Hicks v. Oklahoma, 9 the Court reversed a state sentencing decision that constituted an "arbitrary deprivation" because the decision applied an "invalid" statute. Finally, in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 10 the Court reversed an entitlement decision that constituted an "arbitrary" state action because the state's established procedure denied a state-created entitlement in a "random" manner. 11 Together these cases may be viewed as providing support for a substantive due process rule against arbitrary state decisions, 12 even though they did not explicitly rely on substantive due process grounds. 13 Although arguably Thompson, Logan, and Hicks support a rule against arbitrary state civil decisions, the Supreme Court has elected to read those cases narrowly or to avoid the issue altogether. 14 In the 6. See, e.g., Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339 (1981) (apparently inconsistent verdicts); Connecticut Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 467 (1981) (denying application for commutation oflife sentence); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 517 (1978) (explanation of reasons supporting a trial court decision "not constitutionally mandated").
7. 362 U. S. 199 (1960) . As this Note will be referring extensively to this case, Thompson will hereinafter be cited only when direction to specific pages is needed, or when the reference is especially helpful.
8. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315.(1979) (describing Thompson) . Although Thompson dealt with a criminal conviction, its broad language has made it unclear whether the decision applies to state civil decisions, in addition to state criminal decisions. See Thompson, 362 U.S. at 204. 9. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). 10. 455 U.S. 422 (1982) . 11. 455 U.S. at 433-34. 12. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979) (The Court infers that the Thompson no evidence rule is a substantive due process rule.) A number of courts of appeals have ruled that one has a substantive due process right to be free from arbitrary state decisions. See, e.g., Shelton v. City of College Station, 754 F.2d 1251 754 F.2d , 1256 754 F.2d -57 (5th Cir. 1985 (arbitrary denial of zoning variance may violate due process); Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 716 F.2d , 1420 716 F.2d -21 (4th Cir. 1983 ) (arbitrary denial of building permit may violate due process); Evans v. City of Chicago, 689 F.2d 1286 689 F.2d , 1298 689 F.2d (7th Cir. 1982 ) (delayed payment of tort judgment in violation of state law may violate due process). The court of appeals cases that have applied the Hicks rule have not described the rule in terms of a procedural or substantive due process right. See Part 111.C infra.
13. In Thompson, the Court did not indicate whether the no-evidence rule was based on procedural or substantive due process. 362 U.S. at 199. But in Superintendent, Mass. Correct. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) , the Court described an identical "some evidence" standard as a procedural due process rule. See Part I.A.1.b infra. Both Logan, 455 U.S. at 432-34, and Hicks, 447 U.S. at 346, were based upon procedural due process grounds.
14. See Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376, 387 n.4 (1986) (reading Hicks narrowly as a procedural due process case); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 223 (1985) ; Pulley [Vol. 86:2010 absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals have taken opposing positions on the issue.
Several courts of appeals have read the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks decisions broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. The Sixth Circuit decision in Spruytte v. Walters 15 provides a good example of how the rule against arbitrary state decisions has been applied in practice. In Spruytte, the court applied the rule against arbitrary state decisions to a state prison board's decision to prohibit a prisoner from receiving a dictionary from his mother. The court, after concluding that the applicable state law only permitted the prison to prohibit prisoners from receiving books that posed a threat to security, 16 held that the decision to prohibit the dictionary was unconstitutionally arbitrary, because the decision both lacked evidentiary support and deviated from state law. The court found doctrinal support for this rule against arbitrary decisions in the Thompson and Logan decisions.11
Other circuits have also used the rule against arbitrary state decisions. For example, the Eighth Circuit applied the Thompson doctrine to review a state educational institution decision that appeared to lack evidence. 18 Reviewing a variety of state decisions, job terminations, and business license revocations, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have interpreted Logan broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions that appeared to violate state law. 19 Finally, after reviewing state sentencing decisions that appeared to apply incorrect statutes, the Fifth Circuit has held that Hicks supports a ru!e against arbitrary state decisions. 2 0 A number of commentators have also advocated a broad rule against arbitrary state civil decisions. 21 In support of this rule, they v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984) ; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322-24 (1975) (expressly declining to decide whether Thompson applied to state school board decisions).
15. 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1985 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 753 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. (1986 . The court relied on Thompson in holding that the decision violated due process because the state officials deprived Spruytte of his dictionary without a determination "that the book posed a threat to security." 753 F.2d at 509. The Court also relied on Logan in holding that the state decision violated due process because the prison "willfully [and] LAW 217 & n.6 (1979) (rule of Jaw applies primarily to prohibit arbitrary judicial Jaw application, rather than arbitrary judicial Jaw creation); Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 579, 594, 630 (1984) Gudges must follow rule of "governmental consistency"); Morgan, The Right To Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 297, 299-317 (1982) 32 The Court apparently relied on arbitrariness grounds to avoid addressing difficult questions about the scope of certain constitutional protections. For this reason, these cases need not be read to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. Rather, these cases can be read narrowly as prophylactic rules that were only designed to protect specific constitutional freedoms.
A. Thompson and Hicks as Criminal Procedure Cases
In Thompson, the state's conviction implicated a number of criminal guarantees such as the presumption of innocence and the protection afforded by the ex post facto clause. In addition, the Court's analysis in a recent case, Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 33 suggests that the Thompson no-evidence rule may apply only to state criminal decisions that constitute findings of misconduct that impose the threat of prison confinement. Likewise, Hicks can be read narrowly as a criminal procedural case because it appears that the Court was primarily concerned with protecting Hicks' right to jury sentencing and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
Thompson: Concern About Protecting Criminal Procedural Guarantees
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 34 the Court reversed a state court decision solely for lack of evidence. 35 Sam Thompson was convicted by a city police court for loitering and disorderly conduct, and fined $10 for each charge. The record showed that Thompson, a longtime resident of Louisville and frequent patron of the Liberty End Cafe, was in the cafe for half an hour, moving his feet in rhythm with the music of a jukebox. 36 Thompson testified that he had been waiting for a bus. Two police officers entered the cafe on a "routine check." One of the officers asked Thompson why he was there, and Thompson answered that he was waiting for a bus. Thompson for loitering and took him outside. The officer testified that Thompson "was very argumentative -he argued with us back and forth." He was therefore arrested and convicted for disorderly conduct and loitering. 37 Because the offense was minor, no appellate review was available in the Kentucky courts. 38 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.
In reviewing the conviction, the Court said that it was attempting to determine whether there was a total lack of evidence, rather than undertaking a general inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence. 39 After examining the elements of each charge against Thompson, it concluded that the record was "entirely lacking in evidence to support any of the charges" and that punishment "without evidence of guilt" violates due process. 40 Since 1960, the Court has applied the no-evidence doctrine to reverse seven state criminal convictions 41 and one state probation revocation decision. 42 The doctrine no longer has significant application for review of criminal decisions because the Thompson doctrine has been displaced by Jackson v. Virginia. 43 Jackson established that, in addition to reviewing state convictions for total lack of evidence, federal courts may undertake a more extensive review for sufficiency of evidence. 44 The new standard, the Court stated, was designed to protect the principle articulated in In Re Winship: that due process requires criminal convictions to be based upon a showing of guilt beyond a "reasonable doubt." 45 204, 206 . Examining the loitering charge, the Court found the evidence lacking. The Court said Thompson had accounted for himself when he said he was waiting for a bus, there was no evidence that he was loitering or loafing "in the ordinary sense of the words," and finally, the manager's failure to object to Thompson's presence was "implied consent, which the city admitted in oral argument satisfies the ordinance." 362 U.S. at 205. Examining the disorderly conduct charge, the Court said that the officer's statement that Thompson was "argumentative" was not sufficient to constitute disorderly conduct. 48. In defending against the loitering and disorderly conduct charges at trial, Thompson relied on a definition of these crimes that included certain specific elements. 362 U.S. at 204-06. By convicting Thompson without evidence of all of these elements, the state court apparently adopted a broader definition of the crime that did not include all the elements which Thompson believed were required. For this reason, Thompson did not know the elements of the charges that he should contest. The Court itself suggested that the no-evidence doctrine ensures proper notice of charges when it stated, "Just as '[c]onviction upon a charge not made would be sheer denial of due process,' so is it a violation of due process to convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt." 362 U.S. at 206 (footnote omitted) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 362 (1937) Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 190 (1961) 
b. Limiting the no-evidence doctrine to criminal convictions and other findings of misconduct that impose the threat of prison confine-
Thompson and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) , to reverse a state court revocation of probation. The state court revoked Douglas' probation for failing to report a traffic citation. The terms of that probation required that " '[a]ll arrests for any reason must be reported without delay to [petitioner's] probation and parole officer.'" 412 U.S. at 430. Examining the state statutes, the Court said that an "arrest" under Missouri and Arkansas law existed only when a person was subject to "actual restraint" or taken into "custody.'' 412 U.S. at 431-32. The Court concluded that the state's finding of an arrest violated due process because there was no evidence petitioner was subjected to an "actual restraint" or taken into "custody.'' 412 U.S. at 432 (citing Thompson). The Court rejected the argument that the state court had redefined "arrest" to include a traffic citation. 412 U.S. at 432.
51. See, e.g., Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 55 (1969) (Black, J., concurring). 52. Justice Douglas made this analogy between the Thompson no-evidence doctrine and the statutory presumption doctrine in his dissent to Barnes v. United States, 412 U. S. 837 (1972) . Barnes upheld a statutory presumption that the unexplained possession of recently stolen mail is sufficient to enable a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed the mail with knowledge it was stolen. Douglas argued in dissent that the statutory presumption violated the right to a fair trial. If Thompson means anything, he stated, it means that Congress may not "constitutionally enact a law that says juries can convict a defendant without any evidence at all from which an inference of guilt could be drawn. ' (1894)). But see Pennzoil, 107 S. Ct. at 1530 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that "Texaco cannot, consistent with due process and equal protection, be arbitrarily denied the right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard on appeal").
54. See United States v. One 56-Foot Motor Yacht Named the Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276 702 F.2d , 1283 702 F.2d (9th Cir. 1983 ) (refusing to apply Thompson to a civil action); Rose v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 679 F.2d 279, 282 (1st Cir. 1982 ) (same). But cf. Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 602 (arguing that the Court should ensure fair procedures just as vigorously in civil cases as in criminal cases). [Vol. 86:2010 
ment.
Recently, in Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution v. Hill, 55 the Court curiously applied a no-evidence rule identical to that in Thompson, yet failed to mention Thompson itself. The Court reviewed a state parole revocation decision to determine whether the decision was based on "some evidence." 56 In dicta, the Hill Court indicated its willingness to extend the some-evidence doctrine to other state civil decisions if they affect "important liberty interest [s] ."5 7
Hill involved a state parole board's revocation of two inmates' good-time credits. 58 The inmates sued in state court but based their arguments on federal, not state, constitutional law. 59 Instead, they successfully argued in the state supreme court that the state decision violated federal due process because it was not supported by "some evidence." 60 The Supreme Court accepted the some-evidence standard as applicable to state parole revocation decisions, but it found that the state decision was, in fact, supported by some evidence. 61
The implication of Hill is that the federal courts may review state court decisions affirming parole board revocation decisions to determine whether the parole decision was supported by some evidence. 62 Furthermore, the Court suggested in dicta that the some-evidence rule applies to state court decisions other than those involved with the revocation of parole and probation: "In a variety of contexts, the Court REV. 943, 943 n.6 (1987) . The Hill some-evidence doctrine has also been applied to a variety of prison disciplinary actions, most frequently in cases in which the prison board's decision was based on the uncorroborated hearsay statements of confidential informants, see, e.g., Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493 828 F.2d (10th Cir. 1987 ) (such statements may not be sufficient); Mendoza v. Miller, 770 F.2d 1287 , 1295 , cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986) (such statements may not be sufficient); or when the prison board decision was based on urinalysis test results, see, e.g., Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 7S3, 756 (8th Cir. 1986 ) (such tests may be sufficient); Pella v. Adams, 638 F. Supp. 94 (D. Nev. 1986 ) (such tests may not be sufficient).
SS. 472 U.S. 44S, 4SS (198S
has recognized that a governmental decision resulting in the loss of an important liberty interest violates due process if the decision is not supported by any evidence." 63 At the same time, the Court cautioned that federal courts should not use the some-evidence requirement to "second-guess" state factual findings. 64 In deciding to apply the some-evidence rule to state parole revocation decisions, the Hill Court relied on the three-prong balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. 65 In procedural due process cases, the Supreme Court has used the Mathews test to determine the types of procedural protections required when the government deprives an individual of a liberty or property interest. 66 The Mathews test considers three factors: (1) th~ private interest affected by the state action; (2) the governmental interest affected by requiring the procedural safeguard; and (3) the value of the additional procedural safeguard. 6 7 Applying this balancing test analysis in Hill, the Court held that the imposition of the some-evidence rule to other types of state civil decisions will depend on a balancing of the private and governmental interests affected in each case. 68 The Hill Court emphasized the individual's important liberty interest in "freedom from confinement," adding that the rule would not impose significant burdens on parole proceedings. 69 Although the dicta in Hill suggest that the no-evidence doctrine may extend to civil cases other than parole and probation revocation decisions, Hill should be read narrowly. The Court's holding simply reaffirmed the Buder rule that the no-evidence doctrine applies to parole and probation revocation decisions as well as criminal decisions. 70 In addition, the Court indicated its reluctance to "second-guess" state factual findings, concluding that the evidence at issue satisfied the . some-evidence requirement. 71 ity opinion, however, avoided the due process issue. Even if Ewing had such a right, the majority stated, the University's action was supported by the evidence. 79 In addition, the Court expressed its reluctance to "trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational institutions. " 80 Justice Powell squarely addressed the due process' issue in his concurrence. He argued that Ewing did not have a substantive due process right to be free from state action taken without evidentiary support. Due process, Powell argued, requires the state to provide only procedural protections when the state deprives a person of a statecreated property interest. 81 Substantive due process rules, Powell argued, should only apply when the state infringes upon "fundamental interests" which historically have been "viewed as implicitly protected by the Constitution." 82 Under Powell's analysis, state actions that violate state law do not violate due process if they interfere with liberty interests that are merely "important." Rather, such state actions violate due process only if they interfere with historically recognized "fundamental liberty interests." Powell's analysis suggests that the Thompson no-evidence doctrine should be limited at least to criminal convictions, parole/probation revocation decisions, and prison disciplinary actions. These decisions, which constitute findings of misconduct that impose the sanction of prison confinement, implicate historically recognized fundamental liberty interests not implicated by state civil decisions. 83 In this way, the no-evidence doctrine may be viewed as a criminal procedural right only applicable to criminal convictions and other disciplinary decisions that impose the threat of prison confinement.
Hicks as a Criminal Procedure Case
In Hicks v. Oklahoma, the Court again appears to have applied a rule against arbitrary state decisions to protect criminal procedural rights. 84 Defendant Hicks was tried and convicted for distributing heroin. Because he had two previous felony convictions, the jury had been instructed to sentence him to forty years' imprisonment based on the habitual offender statute then in effect. After Hicks' conviction, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in an unrelated case, invalidated the recidivist provision as unconstitutionally vague. 85 [ Vol. 86:2010 subsequent appeal to that court, Hicks asked to have his forty-year sentence set aside. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the statute was unconstitutional but affirmed the conviction and sentence nonetheless. The court reasoned that Hicks was not prejudiced by the impact of the invalid statute, since his sentence was within the range of punishment that could have been imposed in any event. 86 On certiorari, the Supreme Court applied its familiar two-step due process entitlement analysis. This test requires that a reviewing federal court first examine the relevant state law to determine whether a person had a "property" or "liberty" interest under that law. 87 This determination will normally depend on the state's statutory, regulatory, and judicial pronouncements. 88 Second, the court must determine whether the agency deprived the person of his or her "property" or "liberty" interest without due process. To determine the amount of procedure that is "due," the Court will employ the three-tiered analysis of Mathews v. Eldridge. 8 9 The most difficult part of the analysis is determining whether the state had created a "property" or "liberty" interest in the first place. In the typical case, after a state agency revokes a benefit, the aggrieved party goes immediately before federal district court, alleging a deprivation of constitutional rights under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 90 215 (1976) .
If the state supreme court has ruled on the existence-of-entitlement issue in the case at hand or in other similar cases, the Court has usually deferred to these rulings as authoritative statements of state law. 92 Applying this two-part due process analysis in Hicks, the Court first found that Hicks had a liberty interest. This liberty interest arose from Hicks' "substantial and legitimate expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion . . . ." 93 The Court stated that Hicks was "entitled under state law" to a different jury sentence. While Hicks had been sentenced under the recidivist statute, which required a forty-year mandatory sentence, the "correct" statute would have allowed the jury to impose a sentence of a minimum of ten years' imprisonment.9 4 · The Court next held that the state had deprived Hicks of this liberty interest without due process. 95 Even if the state court had the right to modify his sentence, its consideration of Hicks' claim did not provide him with adequate procedural protection, the Court said, because the appellate court did not "purport to cure the deprivation by itself reconsidering the appropriateness of the petitioner's 40-year sentence."96 The Supreme Court deemed "arbitrary" the state court's "frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender provision. 96. 447 U.S. at 347. The Court also rejected the argument that the appellate court had the discretion to increase the sentence on appeal, even if the trial court had applied the wrong statute. Oklahoma Statute title 22, section 1066 (1971) gave Oklahoma appellate courts the power to "reverse, affirm or modify the judgment appealed from." 447 U.S. at 347. To justify its reluctance to accept the state court's interpretation of state law, the Court noted that the state's assistant attorney general had stated in oral argument that "it was doubtful whether the appellate court had power" under state law to increase a sentence on appeal. 447 U.S. at 347. Despite the Court's suggestion in Hicks that the Oklahoma state appellate courts did not have discretion to modify lower court sentences, the Oklahoma appellate court later reaffirmed its right to modify sentences. Hicks was sentenced, the then-valid statute dictated that the jury impose a mandatory forty-year sentence. It is incorrect to say that Hicks had an expectation that he would be sentenced under any other statute. It is true that the Oklahoma appellate court later declared the statute under which Hicks had been sentenced unconstitutional. But the court's refusal to give retroactive effect to its earlier decision, 98 even to a case pending on appeal when the decision was made, was consistent with established principles of retroactivity. 99 In fact, the appellate court had declared the habitual offender statute unconstitutional because the statute mandated sentences that were too lenient on a defendant with two prior convictions (like Hicks).1 00
Although the Court explicitly relied on procedural due process cases, 101 Hicks cannot be squared with traditional procedural due process analysis. Hicks was not a case in which a state agency or court denied an entitlement without procedural due process. Rather, the state appellate court decided as an initial matter that state law did not give Hicks a substantive right to be resentenced by a jury under the jury sentence statute. 102 Although allowing the jury to resentence Hicks under this statute might have resulted in a different sentence, Hicks nevertheless received procedural due process because he had full opportunity to argue in the appellate court that the court should have applied this statute to remand the case for jury resentencing.1o 3 Despite its broad due process language, Hicks should not be read S. 537 (1982) , the Court modified the rule of retroactivity for the announcement of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure. The Court said courts can only refuse to apply a new constitutional rule on criminal procedure to cases pending on appeal if the rule was a "clear break" from the past. In Griffith v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 708 (1987) , the Court again modified the rule, saying that courts could not refuse to apply a new constitutional rule to cases pending review. Hicks falls within this range of cases.
99. In Andrews v. Shulsen, 600 F. Supp. 408, 430 (D. Utah 1984) , ajfd., 802 F.2d 1256 802 F.2d (10th Cir. 1986 ) (death penalty case) the defendant argued that Hicks supported the proposition that state courts must retroactively apply newly announced state constitutional rulings. The district and appellate courts refused to read Hicks so broadly. The district court rejected the argument, saying that the state court's decision was not "arbitrary" nor "based on mere conjecture," but rather "based on a rational application of established principles of retroactivity." The Court of Appeals rejected the argument on slightly different grounds. The court found Hicks inapposite because the state court had decided the defendant did not have a state-created entitlement. The court indicated it was not proper for it to review the state court's decision. 802 F.2d at 1271 n.13. to stand for the proposition that any state court decision that "arbitrarily" deviates from a state statute or prior state court holding violates due process. The Court may have been motivated by a concern that Hicks received a judge-determined sentence rather than a jury sentence. The Court expressed its concern that the state court had taken away Hicks' statutorily-created right to jury sentencing on the "frail conjecture" that a judge could decide an alternative sentence that was consistent with a jury sentence. 104 The right to jury sentencing, the Court implied, was more than a mere statutory right. Rather, it was a constitutional right that the state could not take away, at least not without a good reason. Furthermore, the Court may have been concerned that Hicks' forty-year sentence for the sale of heroin with two prior convictions violated the eighth amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment because it was excessive. 105 By relying on the rule against arbitrary decisions, the Court was able to reverse the state court decision without explicitly addressing the broader constitutional issues concerning the eighth amendment and jury sentencing. 106 In both Thompson and Hicks the defendant challenged state actions that raised important questions about the scope of certain criminal guarantees, such as the right to an appeal or the right to jury sentencing. In both cases the Court managed to provide the defendant with relief without explicitly addressing these issues. Instead, the Court relied on broad language condemning arbitrary state decisions. Because it appears the Court was primarily concerned with securing criminal procedural protections, these cases should not be interpreted to support a broad rule against arbitrary state decisions.
104. Hicks, 441 U.S. at 346-47. The state appellate court emphasized that because the punishment imposed was within the range of punishment authorized by Oklahoma law, the defendant was not prejudiced by the use of the habitual offender statute. Hicks v. State, No. F-77-751 (Mar. 8, 1979) A second framework for distinguishing the cases that seem to create a general rule against arbitrary state decisions focuses on the Court's concern for constitutionally protected activity. In Thompson and Logan, for example, it appears the Court was primarily concerned with preserving conduct protected by the first ainendment and the equal protection clause yet chose to avoid the constitutional issues by phrasing its decision in terms of arbitrariness.
Thompson as a First Amendment and Equal Protection Case
In Thompson, the conviction for loitering and disorderly conduct constituted a decision that state law prohibited Thompson's conduct. This interpretation of state law may have violated Thompson's first amendment rights by convicting him for merely arguing. 107 In addition, the court may have violated his fundamental right to freedom of movement by punishing him for shuffiing his feet.1os
In almost every subsequent Supreme Court case applying Thompson to a state decision, the Court has used the no-evidence doctrine as a prophylactic rule to protect first amendment and equal protection rights implicated by the state decision at issue. 109 In four cases involving segregation practices, the Court used the Thompson doctrine to protect first amendment and equal protection values. First, in Garner v. Louisiana, 110 the Court reversed the "disturbing the peace" convictions of blacks who had conducted "sit-ins" at segregated lunch 107. A number of commentators have argued that the Court may have intended "no evidence to support a conviction" to mean "no evidence to support a conviction for constitutionally 108. The Court later recognized the fundamental right to "walk and stroll" in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1971) .
109. Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit has suggested that the Court has used the no·evidence doctrine to reverse convictions when the lack of evidence showed that the arrest and prosecution were racially motivated. In Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1972 ) (Brown, J., dissent· ing), he explained:
[A]n utter absence of evidence to support a criminal charge becomes of critical significance to a determination of whether or not the arrest and prosecution are racially motivated .... It is no mere coincidence that Negroes have figured prominently in many of those cases in which the Supreme Court has reversed State convictions grounded on evidence so insufficient as to constitute a denial of due process of law. [Vol. 86:2010 Gregory reversed the disorderly conduct convictions of a group of marchers. 119 Vachon reversed the conviction of a store owner for "willfully" contributing to the delinquency of a minor by selling a button inscribed "Copulation Not Masturbation" to a fourteen-year-old girl.120
In almost every Thompson no-evidence case, the Court used the Thompson doctrine to enforce constitutional protection of activities threatened by the state action at issue. Because Thompson is properly viewed as a doctrine designed to secure such constitutional protection, it need not be applied to state decisions that do not implicate the exercise of constitutional rights.
Logan: Concern About Protecting Equal Protection Values
In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., plaintiff Logan filed suit against his employer with the Illinois Fair Practices Commission, alleging unlawful termination because of his physical handicap. 121 The Illinois statute required the Commission to convene a factfinding conference within 120 days after the complaint was filed. 122 The Commission's representative, however, scheduled the factfinding conference five days after the expiration of the 120-day period. When the confer-119. 394 U.S. 111 (1969) . The Court stated that the defendants' march, if peaceful and orderly, was clearly protected by the first amendment. Still, it ruled on no-evidence grounds, saying there was no evidence of disorderly conduct. 394 U.S. at 112. See WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at 784 n.15 (arguing that the case could have been decided on first amendment grounds).
120. 414 U.S. 478 (1974) . The Court concluded that New Hampshire law required the state to prove that the accused knew the girl was a minor, and that he personally sold her the button or personally caused another to sell it to her. 414 U.S. at 478-79. But the evidence, based solely on the girl's testimony, only showed that the girl bought the button from "some person" in the store. (The store owner conceded he "controlled the premises" on that date.) The Court concluded that there was "no evidence" the defendant sold the button, knew it had been sold to a minor, authorized sales to minors, or was even in the store at the time of the sale. 414 U.S. at 480. The Court rejected the argument that the state supreme court had reinterpreted the "willfully" requirement in the statute by affirming the conviction. The Court reversed on no-evidence grounds apparently because the Court was unwilling to declare a new constitutional rule of obscene speech, even though a strong argument can be made that the conviction violated the first amendment as it had been interpreted at that time. 122. At the factfinding conference, if the Commission found "substantial evidence" of illegal conduct, it was to try to reach conciliation, or, if that proved impossible, issue a formal complaint against the employer. FEPA § § 858-858.01. ence date arrived, the employer moved to dismiss the charge, but the Commission rejected the request. The employer petitioned the Illinois Supreme Court to stay the Commission proceeding. The court held that the statute's time deadline deprived the Commission of jurisdiction to hear Logan's claim. 123 Logan appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming, among other things, that the state decision violated due process because it was arbitrary.
The Supreme Court began its decision by employing the traditional two-part entitlement analysis. 124 First, the Court decided that Logan had a property interest consisting of a right to bring a claim under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act. 125 Next, the Court held that Logan did not receive procedural due process before he was deprived of his property interest.126
At this point, the Court's reasoning is unclear. In the initial part of the decision, the Court indicated that Logan's property interest was his right to bring a claim. 127 Therefore, procedural due process would require only that Logan be given a hearing to determine whether he had this right. In fact, Logan was afforded a hearing in the Illinois Supreme Court. Yet later the Court suggested that Logan had a property right to afavorable decision that would vindicate his "right to be free from discriminatory treatment." 128 Thus, the Court held that procedural due process entitled Logan to a hearing on the merits of the claim (the procedure due) before the Commission decided to refuse his 123. The Illinois Supreme Court relied on a previous decision and noted the statute's policy concern for facilitating the "just and expeditious resolutions of employment disputes," while protecting employers "from unfounded charges of discrimination." Logan, 455 U.S. at 427 (quoting Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Commn., 82 Ill. 2d 99, 107, 106, 4 N.E.2d 277, 282, 281 (1980) ). The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected Logan's argument that his due process and equal protection rights would be violated by allowing the Commission's error to extinguish his cause of action. The state legislature had established the right to petition for redress for discriminatory employment practices, the court said, and "[t]he legislature could establish reasonable procedures to be followed upon a charge." Logan, 455 U.S. at 427 (quoting Zimmerman Brush Co., 82 Ill. 2d at 108, 411 N.E.2d at 282). The court also ruled that Logan could not file a second charge with the Commission based on the same act of alleged discrimination, because this would circumvent the design of the statute and frustrate the public interest in 631-34 (1985) .
[ Vol. 86:2010 right to redress his discrimination (the deprivation). 129 What the Court at first had deemed the property interest (the right to bring a claim) now became the procedure (the right to be heard on the merits) constitutionally necessary before the state could reject his claim on the merits. 130 Thus, Logan had the right to a hearing on the merits before the state refused to redress the discrimination. The Court's willingness to disregard the state court's holding on the existence of a state-created entitlement (the right to bring a claim) may have been motivated by its concern over employment discrimination.131 The Court appears to be tacitly saying that Logan had a constitutional right to be free from discrimination. If this right were at stake, the Court could have reviewed the state procedural rules that blocked Logan from bringing a constitutional claim under the inadequate state ground doctrine. 132 However, by silently changing the nature of the property interest while remaining within the traditional due process analysis, the Court was able to protect Logan's right to be free from discrimination without announcing a new constitutional doctrine concerning discrimination.
In Thompson and Logan it appears that the Court relied on the rule against arbitrary decisions to avoid explicitly addressing the scope of specific constitutional freedoms implicated by the state action. A number of courts of appeals have also adopted the Thompson and Logan rules against arbitrary decisions as a prophylactic means to review state decisions that implicated specific constitutional guarantees. In Court also noted that it was concerned with protecting a "fundamental interest." 455 U.S. at 430 n.5. See, also Rutherford v. United States, 702 F.2d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 1983 ) (suggesting that the Court's decision in Logan was motivated in part by the Court's concern about "Logan's right to be free from discriminatory treatment").
132. The inadequate state ground doctrine, as formulated in a number of Court cases, provides that state procedural grounds may be deemed "inadequate" when (1) they are "plainly untenable," "novel," or "an arid ritual of meaningless form"; (2) they lack fair or substantial support in state law; or (3) they place unreasonable obstacles to assertion of federal rights. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) . See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 22, at § 4027; Spann, supra note 119, at 970-71.
133. 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. 1985 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. (1986 . The court relied on Thompson and Logan in finding that a prison's refusal to allow a prisoner to receive a dictionary violated substantive due process where the refusal violated state administrative rules. The court made a brief reference to the prisoner's first amendment right to receive a dictionary. 753
F.2d at 501-02. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
134. 707 F.2d 1571 707 F.2d , 1575 707 F.2d , 1577 707 F.2d -78 & n.3 (11th Cir. 1983 . The court adopted a rule against arbitrary decisions, citing Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) , which reversed a lower federal court Thompson decision. The Barnette court held that a state job termination in violation of state rules may violate substantive due process. The record indicated that the plaintiff was fired because one of her bosses was angry that a member of the plaintiff's staff talked to the press. The court may have sought to protect the plaintifrs (and her stairs) first amendment right to talk to the press. 135. 840 F.2d 213, 217-18 (3d Cir. 1988) S. 529 (1974) , held that a zoning board's refusal to grant an exemption to a video store may have violated due process. Additionally, the court said the decision may have violated the first amendment.
136. 716 F.2d 1409 716 F.2d , 1420 716 F.2d -21 & nn.17, 19 (4th Cir. 1983 ). The court, citing Logan, held that the refusal to grant a building permit to a black man may violate substantive due process if the refusal violated state law. The court's equal protection concerns were made evident in its discussion of the plaintifrs race discrimination claim.
137. 794 F.2d 322, 323, 327-8 (8th Cir. 1986 ). The court, citing Logan, held that the school board may have violated substantive due process by arbitrarily firing the plaintiff after he became blind. The court made its equal protection concerns explicit when it held that the plaintiff had stated a valid claim for discrimination under a federal anti-discrimination law.
138. Comment, Jackson v. Virginia, supra note 48, at 1588-89. [Vol. 86:2010 individual liberty, 139 accuracy, 140 consistency, 141 reliance, 142 and majoritarianism. 143 It is not clear that the rule against arbitrariness would serve these values. Procedural guarantees at the state level ensure that a participant is given full opportunity to argue the law and facts of the case. 144 Another layer of appellate review by the federal courts does not ensure a more accurate or consistent decision, but it does ensure additional costs and uncertainty while the case is pending. While an arbitrary decision may violate the expectations of some persons, the state court and agencies with discretionary power must have the power to change the law to conform to changing conditions and values. 145 The impor-139. The concern for individual liberty arises from a concern that state decisionmakers will rely on "impermissible" factors in making their decisions. See, e.g., J. RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 21, at 220-21; Rubin, supra note 21, at 1103, 1105-06 & n.297 (Unfettered discretion may allow state agents to "demand bribes, seek unreasonable obeisance, take revenge, or act on the basis of caprice or inadvertence."); Smolla, supra note 21, at 501 (concern about "administrative action that goes beyond discretion into the realm of impermissible activity");
Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 488 (concern about "adjudicative procedural arbitrariness"); cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 258-60 (1971) tance of judicia1 decisionmaking is at the root of the common law tradition. In addition, although strict judicial enforcement of statutes and regulations may serve the interests of majoritarianism, such enforcement may not be desirable. The judiciary and agencies with discretionary power need the flexibility to consider equitable factors when interpreting and applying the law to novel fact situations. Furthermore, state courts and agencies need the power to disobey "bad" laws -such as laws ordering racia1 discrimination -to promote constitutional and other external values. By allowing the federal courts to "correct" arbitrary state court and agency decisions, the federal courts prevent the state courts and agencies from operating as a va1uable check on the legislature. Strict application of statutes may, in some cases, lead to injustice if the state law at issue is unjust. 14 6
Difficulties in Applying a Rule Against Arbitrary State Decisions
A fundamental tension exists between the rule against arbitrariness and federalism. The arbitrariness rule would dictate that every error of state law presents a justiciable federa1 question. But federa1 court review of arbitrary state decisions intrudes into state power to decide issues of state law: decisions that appear to be arbitrary may in fact be valid interpretations of state law. A state decision that appears to be based on insufficient evidence may in reality be redefining the law to apply to the facts present in the case. 147 In addition, an arbitrary state decision that appears to conflict with a statute may actually be a reinterpretation or invalidation of the law. 148 Also, decisions that appear 146. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision. in RONALD DWORKIN AND CONTEMPORARY JURISPRUDENCE 88 (M. Cohen ed. 1983); Horwitz, Book Review, 86 YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) (arguing that legalist jurisprudence inevitably discourages the pursuit of substantive justice); Teachout, Book Review, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 241, 272-88 (1978) (arguing that the rule of law is only desirable when combined with a "respect for the fundamental worth and dignity of all persons" and a "central commitment to the ideals of equality, fairness, justice and freedom from arbitrary control"). But see Leubsdorf, supra note 21, at 596-97 (arguing that pursuit of the rule of law does not necessarily exclude pursuit of higher values).
Acceptance of this argument depends on one's view of the role of the state judiciary. Advocates of the rule against arbitrariness are primarily concerned about state judicial tyranny. See, e.g ., Rubin, supra note 21, at 1105-06. Opponents of the rule against arbitrariness are more concerned about state legislative tyranny. They advocate a strong judiciary as a means to combat legislative tyranny. See, e.g REV. 1043 REV. , 1058 REV. -59 (1977 . A state court affirmance of a conviction, Wechsler argues, is not necessarily an implied ruling that the element on which there was no evidence is no longer required by state law. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 617-18.
148. Westen, Meaning of Equality, supra note 22, at 644 n.79 ("every alleged failure of a state court to comply with its own law can, conceptually, be described with equal validity as a [Vol. 86:2010 to be internally inconsistent may actually rest on unstated rationales or assumptions. 149 Federal court review of arbitrary state decisions is also problematic because states may allocate lawmaking power to different branches of government in any manner they choose. 15° For this reason, it is difficult for a federal court to decide that a decision by one branch is incorrect as a matter of state law because the decision may not yet have been evaluated by the other branches.
The commentators who advocate a rule against arbitrariness recognize that such a rule would interfere with state decisionmaking processes. 151 To resolve this problem, they argue that state law errors should only create federal claims in certain instances, 152 such as when the error is a "clear mistake" 153 or when it affects an individual's rights. 154 But these modifications do not avoid the problem. Even a modified rule against arbitrariness makes a federal court the final interpreter of state law in some cases. Federal review, according to the rule against arbitrariness, is justified solely because the state has failed to decide its own law correctly. Such a rule would fundamentally change the nature of federal-state relations and thwart the values served by federalism.
redefinition by the state court of what its own law really is") (emphasis in original); see also Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 369-71, 380 (arguing that state supreme courts are capable of "wobble," but they cannot err). However, in an earlier article, Brilmayer wrote in a footnote that "[i]n exceptional instances ... there may be Supreme Court review on the basis of arbitrariness, where the claim is that the decision is ad hoc rather than merely a change in law." 1S2. Commentators place different limits on the application of the rule against arbitrary state decisions. Amsterdam admits that federal courts should not "get involved with correcting every nitty-gritty mistake of law made, for example, in a state criminal case in the application of state law." Instead, Amsterdam argues, federal courts should get involved only when the decision adversely affects a "vital and important interest" and when the decision can be considered "crazy." Amsterdam, supra note 21, at 626. Morgan and Smolla are concerned that states follow their own procedures, but only certain procedures. Morgan argues that states should not violate "procedural safeguards" which only include "rules ... designed to protect individual's interests" and not "rules ... designed to promote efficiency or administrative convenience."
Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 29-30. Smolla argues that "some rules should be breachable by either state or federal agencies," without specifying which rules "should be breachable." Smolla, supra note 21, at SOS.
Rubin and Van Alstyne are more vague about their limitations on the rule against arbitrary state decisions. Rubin argues the "rule-obedience principle" should only apply when "the state brings its force to bear." Rubin, supra note 21, at 1107. Van Alstyne argues that the extent of the right to be free from arbitrary procedures depends on the "contextual considerations." Van Alstyne, supra note 21, at 488-89.
1S3. Note, Guarantee Clause, supra note 21, at S79. 1S4. Morgan, Playing by the Rules, supra note 21, at 30; Note, Procedural Rights, supra note 21, at 1024 n.20. First, with fifty different states formulating state law, the system provides fifty laboratories for multiple considerations of problems. Each state is free to create unique solutions unconstrained by a national standard.151
Second, federalism promotes finality. Disputants know the state supreme court is the last forum in which to air grievances, providing final resolution of controversies and final interpretations of state law. Disputants are certain that these decisions will not be reversed later by another higher level court. An extra layer of review only adds. costs and uncertainty. 158
Third, federalism prevents federal courts from interfering in state law-making processes. States are free to divide law-making power between state government branches in any manner they choose. While the federal constitution requires separation of powers for the federal government, it does not require separation of powers for state governments.159 Within each state, power is divided among different 158. Justice Jackson's concurrence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1952) , reflected this concern for finality:
Whenever decisions of one court are reviewed by another, a percentage of them are reversed. That reflects a difference in outlook normally found between personnel comprising different courts. However, reversal by a higher court is not proof that justice is thereby better done. There is not doubt that if there were a super-Supreme Court, a substantial proportion of our reversals of state courts would also be reversed. We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final. 344 U.S. at 540 (Jackson, J. concurring). See also Brilmayer, Death of Error, supra note 140, at 368, 383 (1986) (arguing that at some point the decision must be "hardened"); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957) (arguing that extra layers of review do not ensure more justice, but may increase costs and delay).
159. See, e.g ., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 n.6 (1981) ("the states are free to allocate the lawmaking function to whatever branch of state government they may choose"); see also cases cited in note 26 supra. [Vol. 86:2010 branches of government according to the state constitution. Innovation and conflict between the branches of state government may be part of the law-making process. 160 If the federal courts intervene when they disagree with a state court or agency's interpretation of state law, they deny that branch the power to decide issues of state law and, at the same time, deny other branches the opportunity to review the decision themselves. The result may be the skewing of the balance of power in the state.
Federal courts should not review state decisions solely on the ground that they appear to violate state law. Federal courts should only review state court and agency actions that violate state law if the state action itself -without reference to state law -violates specific constitutional guarantees, such as procedural protections, equal protection prohibitions, or first amendment freedoms. 161 161. The Court has held that when a state court finding of fact is important to deciding a constitutional issue, the Court may make an independent examination of the facts when a conclusion oflaw relating to a federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled that it is necessary to analyze the facts in order to pass upon the federal question. Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927 tions, and business license revocations, to determine whether they violated state law. In addition, the Fifth Circuit has held that Hicks supports a rule against arbitrary state decisions, reviewing sentencing decisions to determine whether the state court applied the correct sentencing statute. An examination of the cases interpreting Thompson, Logan, and Hicks to support a rule against arbitrariness demonstrates that this rule imposes an undue intrusion upon state power to decide issues of state law.
A. The Cases Applying Thompson Intrude upon State Autonomy
The Thompson decision has been widely criticized as "curious" 162 and "bound to lead ... into treacherous territory" 163 because it poses the threat of significant federal intrusion into state court powers. The danger of the Thompson doctrine is that federal courts might reverse state decisions which appear to lack evidence under state law (as interpreted by the federal court), even though the state decisions can be equally well explained as valid applications of state law supported by sufficient evidence.
The REV. 384, 386 (1960) (praising the decision, and predicting that it could produce "more cautious observation of due process procedures and requirements by lesser tribunals") [hereinafter Comment, Evidence Required] . 163. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 190 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) .
164. In Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 509 (6th Cir. 1985) , the Sixth Circuit relied on
Thompson in holding that state prison officials violated due process by refusing to allow a prisoner to receive a dictionary from his mother. The prison's decision violated due process, the court said, because the action was not supported by evidence sufficient to satisfy state law requirements. For further discussion of Spruytte, see notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text. 165. In Strickland v. Inlow, 485 F.2d 186, 190 (8th Cir. 1973 ), vac. sub nom. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 324-26 (1975 , the Eighth Circuit reversed a high school board disciplinary action on the ground that there was "no evidence" that the students had violated the school district rule forbidding the use or possession of intoxicating beverages. Although the court of appeals did not cite Thompson, the Supreme Court said the court of appeals had applied the Thompson doctrine. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 323. For further discussion of Strickland, see notes 182-85 infra and accompanying text.
166. In a separate line of cases that do not rely on Thompson, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that substantive due process requires that state government job dismissals must be supported by "substantial evidence." These courts view this requirement as a necessary corollary to procedural due process. See Yashon v. Hunt, 825 F.2d 1016 , 1027 (6th Cir. 1987 ), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2015 (1988 (doctor's dismissal must be "supported by substantial evidence to free it from arbitrariness," quoting Woodbury v. McKinnon, 447 F.2d 839, 842) ; Holley v. Seminore County School Dist., 755 F.2d 1492 755 F.2d , 1499 755 F.2d (11th Cir. 1985 (due process [Vol. 86:2010 review state decisions, even though constitutionally required procedural protections provided the parties affected with adequate opportunity to argue their interpretations of state law before impartial state decisionmakers.
The intrusiveness of this type of review can be seen in a number of the Thompson Supreme Court decisions which reversed state decisions for lack of evidence. In Thompson itself, the state court's decision may be equally well explained as a valid decision that Thompson's conduct in standing at the cafe and arguing with the police officer constituted loitering and disorderly conduct under the state statute. 167 Similarly, in Garner v. Louisiana, the state court's decision may be equally well explained as a decision that the defendants' conduct in gathering at the lunch counter constituted disturbing the peace because the conduct could foreseeably have led to a public disturbance. 168 In Vachon v. New Hampshire, the state court's decision may also be explained as a decision that Vachon's conduct -controlling the premises when "someone" sold a nearly obscene button to a fourteen-year-old girlconstituted willfully contributing to the delinquency of a minor. 169 And in Douglas v. Buder, the state court's decision may be equally well explained as a decision that a traffic citation constituted an arrest for purposes of parole revocation.17°
The danger of extending the Thompson doctrine is also evident in three federal court decisions which relied on the Thompson doctrine to reverse decisions of state educational institutions for lack of evidence. In Jones v. Latexo Independent School District, 171 after excluding evidence based on fourth amendment grounds, the district court conrequires that there be "a rational basis for the deprivation of an individual's property"); Klinge v. Lutheran Charities Assn., 523 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1975 ) (doctor's dismissal must be supported by "substantial evidence"); Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 857 (5th Cir. 1970 ) (due process requires more than "mere ceremonial compliance with procedural due process"); see also Byrd v.
City of Atlanta, 683 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga. 1988 ) (policeman's dismissal must be supported by substantial evidence); Chase v. Fall Mountain Regional School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 388 (D.N.H. 1973 ) (school teacher's dismissal). But see Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 888 (2d Cir. 1987 ) (refusing to review a denial of tow car medallions, and stating that "[s]ection 1983 is not a means for litigating in a federal forum whether a state or local administrative decision was arbitrary and capricious").
167. Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U. S. 199 (1960) . For the argument that the S. 430, 432 (1973) . See also note 50 supra.
171. 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Tex. 1980 and did not ensure a more correct result. The controversy in Ewing arose in 1981 when a nine-member committee reviewed Ewing's record and dismissed him from the university's six-year undergraduate/ medical school program. Ewing's record revealed that he had low grades, seven incompletes, several terms during which he had carried an irregular or reduced course load, and a failing score on the medical board exam -the lowest score in the program's history. Before the school made its final decision to dismiss him, Ewing was provided with four separate hearings in front of two different committees to challenge the action personally. 175 Ewing chose not to seek judicial relief under state law in state court but instead brought an action in federal court, claiming that the university violated his due process rights by arbitrarily expelling him. 176 The district court dismissed Ewing's due process claim, 177 the court of appeals upheld the claim, 178 and the Supreme Court finally dismissed the claim four years after the controversy arose, 179 agreeing with the district court that the university "had good reason to dismiss Ewing from the program." 180 As Justice Powell stated in concurrence, "this is a case that never should have been litigated."181
In Strickland v. Inlow, the Eighth Circuit reversed a school board disciplinary action on the ground that there was "no evidence" that 172. Jones, 499 F. Supp. at 239. In Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F. Supp. 777 (W.D. Mich. 1975) , the court faced a situation similar to Jones, but the Smyth court provided a more sensible remedy. The Smyth court excluded evidence from a disciplinary hearing, and then, unlike the Jones court, remanded the case to allow the school to retry it or dismiss the charges. 499 F. Supp. at 795. 173. 474 U.S. 214 (1985 [ Vol. 86:2010 the students violated the school district rule prohibiting the use or possession of intoxicating liquor. 182 Although the Supreme Court reserved judgment on the issue of whether the Thompson doctrine applies to school board decisions, 183 it reversed the Eighth Circuit's application of the doctrine. The school board's decision that the students violated the state regulation by spiking punch with malt liquor, the Court said, was actually the correct interpretation of state law. 184 Rather than lacking evidence, the school board decision was a valid interpretation and application of state law. Calling the court of appeals' reliance on Thompson "improvident," the Court emphasized that federal courts should not use section 1983 as a vehicle to review school board decisions that do not violate specific constitutional guarantees. 185 The First and Ninth Circuits have refused to apply Thompson to state civil decisions, but they have given only cursory reasons for their refusal. 186 Thompson should not be applied to civil decisions because the application of the Thompson doctrine interferes with state autonomy. As stated in the dissent to the court of appeals decision in Strickland, a broad reading of Thompson "inevitably [leads] to an unwarranted invasion of the duties and responsibilities of state and local governments. " 187 
B. The Cases Applying Logan Intrude upon State Autonomy
An examination of the cases in which the federal courts relied on Logan to review state decisions for arbitrariness also demonstrates that such review similarly intrudes upon state power. A number of courts of appeals have relied on Logan in upholding substantive due process claims against a variety of state decisions. The Logan rule against arbitrary state decisions has been described in the following manner: "[T]akings without any justification are 'governmental actions that even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of due process. ' " 188 120-8 (1983) , the courts also decided that arbitrary zoning decisions violated due process, although they did not rely on Logan. Moore v. Warwick Pub. School Dist. No. 29, 794 F.2d 322, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1986 ) (job termination in violation of contract), and Barnett v. Housing Auth. of Atlanta, 707 F.2d 1571 707 F.2d , 1577 707 F.2d (11th Cir. 1983 [Vol. 86:2010 In each. case, the applicants had been granted procedurally adequate hearings before the decision was made. 195 The federal courts upheld the substantive due process claims, despite the fact that the local zoning boards had been given discretion as quasi-legislative bodies to make zoning decisions. 1 9 6 The courts undertook extensive review of the applicable local zoning laws and ordinances to determine whether the zoning boards had adopted the correct interpretation of their own zoning laws. The federal courts, in these cases, essentially acted as zoning boards of appeals. The net result in each case was that federal court intervention disrupted the zoning decisionmaking process in that particular state. 197 State courts normally play an important role in developing zoning law because the zoning board decisions are review- 840 F.2d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 1988 Strickland, 830 F.2d 1107 , 1114 (11th Cir. 1987 ), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1225 (1988 . In addressing an equal protection challenge to a sewage permit denial decision, the court expressed its unwillingness to find that "any departure from state law would give rise to a constitutional claim." 830 F.2d at 1114 (emphasis in original).
The courts in
195. In Bello, the building permit denial had been upheld by the state lower court, but the state court later reversed its decision. 840 F.2d at 1126. In Neiderhiser, the exemption denial had been upheld by the board, but the state lower court reversed the decision. 840 F.2d at 215. In Littlefield, the building permit denial had been upheld by the zoning board and the city council after "a series of meetings." 785 F.2d at 603. In Shelton, 754 F.2d at 1258, the denial of a parking variance had been upheld by the zoning board and the city planning director. The court noted that judicial review was readily available in the state courts. 754 F.2d at 1257-58. In Scott, 716 F.2d at 1413, the denial of the building permit had been upheld by the city council, a state trial court, and the state supreme court, but the state supreme court later ordered the city council to grant the permit. In Southern Coop, 696 F.2d at 1349-50, the county commission twice re· jected the application after lengthy review.
196. See Shelton IL 780 F.2d at 480-82 (arguing that zoning board decisions should be viewed as quasi-legislative). But see Scott, 716 F.2d at 1420 n.16. 197. See Shelton IL 780 F.2d at 481 (expressing reluctance to "inject federal courts into matters historically the business of states [and] ..• alter the decisional processes for zoning issues"). able in the state courts.19s
In two cases, a federal court intervened before the state court had the opportunity to review the zoning board decision, depriving the state courts of their role in the decisionmaking process. 199 In three other cases, the errors were rectified by the state courts. 200 But the federal courts held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action because they were damaged during the period before the state courts rectified the errors as a matter of law. The federal courts basically served as cheerleaders for the state courts, praising their finding that the zoning actions violated state law. 201 These cases support the curious result that state agency actions that violate state law violate due process, unless the state rectifies the error within a certain period of time.
A number of courts have attempted to limit the application of the Logan rule by relying on a distinction the Logan Court made between systematic violations of state law and random, unauthorized violations of state law. Under this theory, a state action in violation of state law can be cured by post-deprivation procedures if the action was random and unauthorized. 202 In contrast, a state action in violation of state law cannot be cured by post-deprivation procedures if it was systematic, established state procedure. 203 The Logan Court made the distinction in attempting to differentiate its holding from its earlier holding in Parratt v. Taylor. [Vol. 86:2010 "random and unauthorized" actions and because the governmental interests at stake may require a prison official to act quickly. 206 The Logan Court recognized that its holding seemed to conflict with Parratt because it now suggested that state actions deviating from state law violate due process, regardless of the procedural protections provided. The Logan Court held that post-deprivation remedies did not cure the due process problems. It made a feeble attempt to distinguish Parratt, saying that it did not apply where "the state system itself" destroyed a complainant's property interest "by operation of [state] law" or by systematic and "established state procedure." Instead, Parratt applied only where the state's action constituted "random and unauthorized" action by a state official. 207 According to this distinction, post-deprivation remedies may cure state decisions that violate state law by "random and unauthorized" action, but not state decisions that violate state law by "established state procedure." 208 The difficult task is, of course, determining whether a state court or agency violation of state law is "by operation of state law" or "unauthorized." In practice, this distinction is almost impossible to make, especially when a state court made the "arbitrary" decision. Two recent cases, Holloway v. Walker 209 and Anderson v. City of New York, 210 illustrate the problem. In Holloway, the plaintiffs, having lost a state law claim at the state trial and appellate levels, sued the trial judge in federal court claiming that the judge's deviation from state law denied them a fair trial. 211 In particular, they argued that the judge's action constituted established state procedure, and thus vio-lated due process despite the availability of state appellate review. 212 The Fifth Circuit correctly rejected the due process claim, but only after straining to characterize the judge's action as unauthorized state action in order to bring it within the scope of Parratt. 213 In Anderson, the federal district court examined the petitioner's claim that a police officer's failure to return photos violated due process. The state trial court had held that the failure to return the photos did not violate state law. The district court held that the police officer's action (anQ. the state court's affirmance) constituted a systematic deprivation without due process, because "the state system itself" caused the deprivation by a systematic failure to enforce the rules. 214 Thus, the availability of post-deprivation review in state court was irrelevant. The federal court was able to impose its own interpretation of state law on the state court by characterizing the state court's decision as a "systematic" violation of law.
The practical difficulties in applying the distinction between acts "operative of state law" and those that are merely "unauthorized" are compounded by the emptiness of the concept itself. This emptiness is readily apparent from the fact that the federal courts have placed different labels on similar sorts of state action. For example, similar types of state judicial actions that apparently deviated from state law have been found to be both authorized and unauthorized state action. 215 Similar inconsistencies have arisen in connection with certain state zoning decisions in apparent violation of state law. 216 A number of courts have explicitly refused to interpret Logan broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. These courts have declined to review the arbitrariness of zoning decisions, 217 [Vol. 86:2010 job terminations, 218 a business license rejection, 21 9 a child custody decision,220 and a job payment decision. 221 Notably, the First Circuit has most consistently adhered to such a narrow reading of Logan. In a number of these decisions, the courts have noted that a broad reading of Logan directly conflicts with Parratt. 222 Others have placed particular emphasis on the fact that the litigants had ample opportunity to present their interpretation of state law to a state agency or in a judicial hearing. 223
Moreover, these courts have reasoned that the Logan arbitrariness rule would intrude upon state power to decide state law issues and interfere with state lawmaking processes. 224 Significantly, these courts have stated that the added layer of federal review does not ensure a more correct result. 225 State court or agency actions that violate state law should only give rise to due process concerns if the state action in itself -without reference to state law -violates due process; that is, conduct that violates state law should not give rise to a federal claim just because it violates state law unless it implicates federal constitutional protections, such as fourth amendment or procedural due pro-cess protections. 226 For these reasons, Logan should not be read broadly to support a rule against arbitrary state decisions. Logan should instead be limited to its facts.
C. The Cases Applying Hicks Intrude upon State Autonomy
Only the Fifth Circuit has interpreted Hicks to support a rule against arbitrary decisions. In two cases, the Fifth Circuit relied on Hicks in holding that a state court violates due process if it applies the incorrect state sentencing statute. 227 In each case, the trial judge's decision was affirmed by the state supreme court. The federal court reversed the state supreme court's interpretation of its own law and became the ultimate expositor of state law.
In three other cases, the Fifth Circuit has held that state sentencing decisions violate due process if it appears the judge was not aware of his sentencing alternatives. 228 As interpreted by district courts in that circuit, these decisions effectively impose a reasons requirement on state judges: they can escape the Hicks prohibition only by explaining their reasons for their decisions. 229 But the imposition of a reasons requirement on state sentencing judges contradicts Supreme Court precedent holding that state judges are not constitutionally required to state their reasons for making such decisions. 2 30 Other courts of appeals have refused to interpret Hicks to support a rule against arbitrary decisions. The Tenth and Seventh Circuits [Vol. 86:2010 have refused to apply Hicks to reverse state court decisions which allegedly deviated from state law. 231 These courts correctly noted that a broad application of Hicks would intrude upon state power to decide issues of state law. 232 In Hutchinson v. Marshal/, 233 one of the few cases discussing the application of Hicks to a nonsentencing state judicial decision, the district court clearly stated the federalism concerns. In that case, the defendant, relying on Hicks, claimed that the Ohio courts "arbitrarily" denied his rights under the Ohio Speedy Trial Act. The court rejected this argument. "Even assuming that the state 'deviated' from a proper application of the Ohio Speedy Trial Act," the court said, the petitioner received due process because "he was able to present his objections on that score to the Ohio appellate courts." Furthermore, the court concluded that " [p] etitioner's arguments [were] nothing more than a disagreement with how the Ohio appellate courts dealt with (and rejected) his efforts to prevail under an Ohio statute. " 234 
CONCLUSION
The Thompson, Logan, and Hicks cases should be read narrowly for two reasons. First, a close reading of the cases reveals that the Court may have been primarily concerned about protecting other constitutional guarantees implicated by the state decisions. These guarantees include sixth amendment criminal procedural protections and constitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech and equal protection. The Court appears to have relied on the rule against arbitrary state decisions to avoid addressing more difficult constitutional issues involved in the state action. Second, if federal courts rely on these cases to support federal court review of arbitrary state decisions, the federal courts will intrude upon state power to create and interpret state law. State decisions which a federal court believes arbitrarily deviated from state law may in fact be valid attempts by the state courts to redefine state law. In addition, federal court review of decisions that appear to violate state law is disruptive to the state lawmaking processes within each state. Unlike the federal government, the states are free to divide state lawmaking power between state government branches in any manner the states choose. As the First Circuit succinctly stated, a rule against arbitrary state decisions would allow "every disgruntled applicant [to move state law disputes] into the federal courts, even when the state provided adequate procedures, [and] any meaningful separation between federal and state jurisdiction would cease." 235 Thus far, most federal courts have correctly refused to read the Thompson, Logan, and Hicks decisions broadly, recognizing that such a reading would violate the rule that state courts are the ultimate expositors of state law.
-David T. Azrin 235. Roy v. City of Augusta, 712 F.2d 1517 712 F.2d , 1523 712 F.2d (1st Cir. 1983 ).
